

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: TARASOV (USSR) STATEMENT
AT JULY 25, 1978 NSS WORKING GROUP MEETING

CTB MESSAGE NO. 272

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT MADE BY B.I. TARASOV (USSR)
AT JULY 25 NSS WORKING GROUP MEETING: BEGIN TEXT:

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE SOVIET DELEGATION, TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE QUESTIONS PUT TO US BY THE US AND UK DELEGA-
TIONS, IS PREPARED TO SET FORTH A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS
DIRECTED AT CLARIFYING FURTHER THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR
PROPOSALS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL
SEISMIC DATA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SEPARATE
AGREEMENT.

AS YOU ALREADY KNOW, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS
PROPOSED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA
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FOR THE PURPOSES OF FACILITATING VERIFICATION OF TREATY
COMPLIANCE BE IMPLEMENTED ON A STAGE-BY-STAGE BASIS AND,
AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS AGREE TO
THIS PRINCIPLE. TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE
FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF THE STAGE-BY-STAGE APPROACH--THOSE FEATURES WHICH IN
OUR OPINION ARE COMMON TO EACH OF THE STAGES.

FIRST OF ALL, PROCEEDING FROM OUR GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE QUESTIONS OF ORGANIZING VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE BASIS OF VERIFICATION AT EACH STAGE SHOULD BE COMPRISED OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. LATER, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ENSURING ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY PROVISIONS, THE SIDES SHALL ORGANIZE AN EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA FROM A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SEISMIC STATIONS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THEM. THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA WILL BE IMPLEMENTED GRADUALLY IN THE COURSE OF EACH STAGE. THE SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTING MEASURES RELATED TO ORGANIZING THE SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE COULD BE AGREED UPON IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

TURNING FROM THESE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS TO THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF THE INITIAL STAGE OF VERIFICATION, WE WOULD LIKE TO REPLY TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO IT.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE STATIONS DESIGNATED BY THE PARTIES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL DATA EXCHANGE ON A MANDATORY BASIS, ALTHOUGH THE DATA FROM THEM WOULD BE TRANSFERRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
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PROCEDURES SET UP FOR THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, IF OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS HAVE OTHER PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THEM.

TURNING TO DR. FAKLEY'S QUESTION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP NEW STATIONS DURING THE FIRST STAGE, WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT DURING THIS STAGE THE PARTIES' ALREADY EXISTING STATIONS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE USED. IN THIS CONNECTION, AT THE LAST MEETING THE US DELEGATION EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN THAT "EXISTING SEISMIC STATIONS WERE NOT ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TREATY VERIFICATION, AND THEIR SITES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE OPTIMUM SITES FOR THIS TASK." INDEED, WHEN BEING SET UP, THESE STATIONS WERE NOT DESIGNATED AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR THE PURPOSES OF IMPLEMENTING ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE. HOWEVER, IT IS PERFECTLY NATURAL THAT OUT OF THE EXISTING NETWORKS OF STATIONS ONE COULD SELECT STATIONS LOCATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY COULD ENSURE VERIFICATION OF SEISMIC EVENTS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE PARTIES TO THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. IN SELECTING STATION SITES WE, AND I HOPE YOU TOO, ARE GUIDED BY WELL-KNOWN CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE UNIVERSAL

FOR ALL SPECIALISTS, AS FAR AS GEOLOGY, NOISE LEVEL, AND OTHER FACTORS ARE CONCERNED. AND THUS, IN OUR OPINION, DOUBTS REGARDING THE OPTIMAL NATURE OF STATION SITES ARE SOMEWHAT PREMATURE. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IF IN THE COURSE OF IMPLEMENTING THE EXCHANGE IT APPEARS NECESSARY, SITES OF CERTAIN STATIONS WHICH WOULD BE DEPLOYED DURING THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE COULD BE CLARIFIED WITH GREATER PRECISION THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. SITE SELECTION FOR SUCH STATIONS WHICH

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WOULD ACTUALLY BE NEW COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE JCC.

TURNING NOW TO THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA DURING THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE, WE WOULD FIRST OF ALL LIKE TO ADDRESS ISSUES RELATED TO THE UPGRADED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT THIS EQUIPMENT HAVE AGREED BASIC TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, IN WHICH WE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A) FREQUENCY RANGE OF THE RECORDING SYSTEM OF THE SEISMIC STATION;

B) DYNAMIC RANGE OF THE RECORDING SYSTEM OF THE SEISMIC STATION;

C) ACCURACY OF REFERENCING SEISMIC DATA TO THE SYSTEM

OF UNIVERSAL TIME;

D) INTERNAL NOISE LEVEL OF THE RECORDING SYSTEM;
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E) CALIBRATION PROCEDURES FOR THE RECORDING SYSTEM.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO DEFINE AND AGREE UPON SPECIFIC VALUES FOR THESE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE JCC, AND TO INCLUDE IN THE APPROPRIATE ARTICLE OF THIS SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT ONLY THE ABOVE LIST OF CHARACTERISTICS, WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE, PROVIDING WE FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

REGARDING THE SPECIFIC TECHNICAL DEPLOYMENT OF THIS UPGRADED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE MANUFACTURED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE TREATY. WE BELIEVE THAT, BASED ON THE SPECIFIC TECHNICAL TASKS TO BE SOLVED BY THESE STATIONS, AS WELL AS ON INTERNAL NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE PARTIES HAVE THE FULL RIGHT TO USE ANY SEISMIC STATIONS OF THEIR OWN DESIGN OR OTHER STATIONS, BUT OF COURSE WITH AGREED BASIC TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA BY MEANS OF MAGNETIC RECORDING, AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION, WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN THAT RECORDING COULD BE CARRIED OUT CONTINUOUSLY AND THE TAPES THEMSELVES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ON A REGULAR BASIS IN A MANNER ESTABLISHED AND AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES.

THE TRANSFER OF THE ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA BY MEANS
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OF EXCHANGING MAGNETIC TAPES WAS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. KEEPING IN MIND THE PROPOSALS OF THE US AND UK DELEGATIONS FOR A LIMITED TREATY DURATION, AS WELL AS THE EXISTING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT EXTENDING IT, WHICH IS NO FAULT OF OURS, THE SOVIET DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL

SEISMIC DATA SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE LEAST COSTLY WAY.

UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IN OUR VIEW, IT IS MOST ADVISABLE TO USE MAGNETIC TAPES FOR TRANSFERRING THE ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA. THIS TECHNIQUE IS TECHNICALLY WELL DEVELOPED, SUFFICIENTLY SIMPLE, AND CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT LARGE ADDITIONAL COSTS. THIS ALSO ENSURES SOLUTION OF THE TASKS OF ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION, IN TERMS OF THE VOLUME AND QUALITY OF THE DATA TRANSFERRED.

BECAUSE THE VERY FACT OF FURNISHING CONTINUOUS RECORDS OF ALL THE SEISMIC DATA FROM THE STATIONS PLAYS THE MOST IMPORTANT ROLE IN SOLVING THE TASKS OF VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE, AND BECAUSE RELATIVELY SHORT SEGMENTS OF DATA ARE NEEDED FOR ANALYSIS OF SEISMIC EVENTS WHICH GIVE RISE TO DOUBTS, WHILE THE TIME SCHEDULES FOR FURNISHING SUCH DATA ARE NOT AS CRITICAL, THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE TIME SCHEDULES FOR TRANSFERRING THE TAPES DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT OR COMPLEX. MOREOVER, EVALUATING THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR, US, AND UK FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OTHER STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY AND THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE, IT WOULD BE DISCRIMINATORY TO HAVE DIFFERENT TIME SCHEDULES FOR FURNISHING SEISMIC DATA ABOUT EVENTS WHICH GIVE RISE TO DOUBTS.

IN CONCLUDING OUR STATEMENT I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF AUTHENTICATION OF THE ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA BEING TRANSFERRED. IN OUR OPINION, THE METHOD OF

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AUTHENTICATION AND ALSO THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS DEVICE SHOULD BE AGREED UPON. THE US DELEGATION HAS ALREADY SET FORTH A NUMBER OF THOUGHTS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION OF SUCH A DEVICE, AND THEY SEEM MOST INTERESTING TO US. THE ISSUE OF AUTHENTICATING SEISMIC DATA WAS RAISED BY THE US DELEGATION AND THEREFORE WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR THE US TO UNDERTAKE THE TASK OF WORKING OUT, FORMULATING, AND SUBMITTING FOR CONSIDERATION BY OUR SUB-GROUP A PROPOSAL ON THE METHOD OF AUTHENTICATION, THE MAIN TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCH A DEVICE, AND ITS ALGORITHM WHICH THE US BELIEVES NECESSARY TO AGREE UPON. IN OUR OPINION THIS COULD FACILITATE FURTHER PROGRESS IN OUR JOINT WORK.

AS FOR THE ISSUES RELATED TO PROCEDURES FOR MANUFACTURING AN AUTHENTICATION DEVICE, INSTALLING IT, AND OTHER PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, IT SEEMS TO US ADVISABLE TO RESOLVE THEM AFTER AGREEING UPON BASIC PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS. END TEXT. JOHNSON

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